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ABSTRACT 
 
Much is known about the importance of dynamic capabilities. Yet, surprisingly little is known 
about how multiple dynamic capabilities might be developed in parallel, since most existing work 
explores a particular dynamic capability in isolation. Using rich quantitative and qualitative data 
on Dow Chemical’s acquisitions, joint ventures, and divestitures over the past 20 years, we seek 
to address this gap. Besides contributing by adding fresh insights about managing growth and the 
utility of distributed practice, and by shedding light on positive and negative experience transfer, 
our core contribution is an emergent theoretical framework that develops the concept of 
“concurrent learning.” 
 
 
 
  
 
The concept of dynamic capability – defined as “the capacity of an organization to purposefully 
create, extend, or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al., 2007: 4) – is central to the field of strategic 
management (Helfat, 1997; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 
2007). The reason is that dynamic capabilities can enable firms to profitably enter new product (Gilbert, 
2006; King and Tucci, 2002) and geographic markets (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011), revitalize resource 
portfolios (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000), streamline underperforming divisions (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
2001), restructure industry relationships (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Kale and Singh, 2007), and foster 
innovation (Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). Further, scholars suggest that dynamic 
capabilities promote economically significant change not only in more dynamic environments and in new 
ventures, but also in less dynamic environments and in large established firms (Helfat and Winter, 2011). 
Given the importance of dynamic capabilities, much research focuses on how they might be learned 
(Dosi et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007). Empirical work in this stream focuses 
on one dynamic capability in particular such as an acquisition (Capron, Anand, and Mitchell, 2007; 
Heimeriks, Schijven, and Gates, 2012), alliance (Kale and Singh, 2007; Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten, 
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2009), country entry (Bingham et al., 2007), or divestiture (Brauer, 2006; Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007) 
capability. Yet, while understanding how a particular dynamic capability develops in isolation is 
important, such an isolationist view offers little insight into the links among dynamic capabilities. To the 
extent that firms build multiple dynamic capabilities over time, there will likely be overlap between the 
firm members and learning activities involved. Missing from the literature, therefore, is an empirically 
grounded understanding of how learning one dynamic capability might influence the learning of others 
and, in turn, what implications this has for the firm. We address this gap. 
We explore whether and how dynamic capabilities are learned concurrently. Consistent with existing 
research (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Argote and Miron-Spektor, 
2011), we define “learning” as being an observable change in behavior based on experience.1 Given the 
state of extant theory, we rely primarily on theory-building and theory-elaboration methods (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; Lee, 1999; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The empirical setting is the development of 
acquisition, joint venture (JV), and divestiture capabilities within Dow Chemical, the world’s largest 
producer of plastics and the world’s second largest chemical company. We show that concurrent learning 
of dynamic capabilities is aided by three activities: “initiating structure,” “generalizing structure,” and 
“backward-chaining structure.” Concurrent learning begins as firms form a dedicated group to codify 
knowledge. That emerging structure is idiosyncratic to one phase (e.g., implementation) of one process 
(e.g., acquisition) but then is quickly leveraged into multiple processes (e.g., JV and divestiture) and 
further elaborated in a reverse chronological way to address additional phases (e.g., transaction and due 
diligence). Overall, besides setting forth an emergent theoretical framework that develops the concept of 
“concurrent learning” we contribute by adding insights about effective growth and distributed practice, 
and by shedding light on the nature of experience transfer. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
                                                 
1Like others, we acknowledge that learning can occur through changes in cognition without a corresponding change 
in behavior and that learning sometimes, but not always, leads to better outcomes (Argote, 1999; Miner et al. 2001). 
  
 
Ǥ
Dynamic capabilities enable firms to modify their resource position. They include those that pertain 
to doing acquisitions, product development, country entry, alliances and divestitures (e.g., Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997; King and Tucci, 2002; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). These 
activities foster significant change (Helftat and Winter, 2011) and so are less tied to operational 
capabilities that allow firms to sustain current actions and make a living in the present.2  
Although the existing literature does not address how different dynamic capabilities might be 
learned concurrently, it does suggest how a particular dynamic capability can be learned. One way is via 
the accumulation of experience. Experience provides individuals with information that can help them 
better understand the causal linkages between actions and outcomes (Zollo and Winter, 2002). More 
experience with JVs, for example, should allow managers to gain an understanding of how to select new 
partners, manage contract negotiations, and terminate agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Sampson, 
2005). The logic, therefore, is that skill and capacity build through practice (Argote, 1999). 
The timing of experience also appears to influence the learning of dynamic capabilities. Scholars 
argue that too much new knowledge, as well as too little, inhibits effective learning (Hayward, 2002). The 
rhythm of experience may thus regulate its benefits (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick, 1994; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). To illustrate, Hayward (2002) used data on 535 publicly disclosed 
acquisitions and found that the benefits from acquisitions depend on their pacing. Hayward argued that 
acquiring firms learn less from their experience when that experience is accumulated in a rapid sequence 
of acquisitions. Instead, firms were more likely to learn how to perform acquisitions when executives 
paced their acquisition experience and had six-to-twelve-month time intervals between their acquisitions. 
The similarity of experience may likewise impact the way firms learn dynamic capabilities. For 
example, Zollo, Reuer, and Singh (2002) studied 145 alliances in the bio-technology industry and found 
                                                 
2 We acknowledge that some things that are dynamic capabilities in one context may be operational capabilities in 
others. For example, Helfat and Winter (2011) argue that because the everyday business of buy-out firms involves 
conducting acquisitions, their associated capabilities are more operational than dynamic. 
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that alliance experience with the same partner appeared to be important to learning an alliance capability. 
The creation of new alliance agreements with prior alliance partners seemed to allow firms the opportunity 
to exploit prior learning and avoid additional relationship-specific investments in incentive alignment, 
monitoring and formal controls. Likewise, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) analyzed data from 449 large 
acquisitions and found a positive relationship between acquisition similarity and acquisition performance. 
The more similar the focal target’s industry was to those of the firm’s prior targets (measured by four-digit 
SIC code), the better the focal acquisition performed (as measured by abnormal stock returns). 
Research also suggests that the codification of experience impacts the learning of dynamic 
capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Codification is defined as the written documentation of knowledge 
in tools such as manuals and rule books (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Codification 
helps capture the tacit knowledge embedded in individuals’ experiences about how to manage key 
activities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). The exercise of reflecting on past 
actions to create a tool for the execution of a particular task can improve understanding of cause-and-
effect relationships. For example, using a sample of 228 acquisitions Zollo and Singh (2004) found that 
codification of acquisition experience into detailed rule books and manuals for each phase of an 
acquisition led to higher-performing focal acquisitions (as measured by ROA improvement post 
acquisition). Similarly, using a sample of 78 firms with alliance experience, Kale and Singh (2007) found 
that knowledge codification positively influences alliance performance (as measured by abnormal stock 
returns). The authors argue that codification helps firms build and exploit alliance know-how and thus, 
develop the capacity to extend and modify its resource base via alliances. 
Overall, theoretical and empirical studies suggest that dynamic capabilities are learned from 
experience, and that similar, paced, and codified experience is particularly helpful. Yet, while this research 
is valuable, it focuses attention on the learning of one particular dynamic capability (e.g., an acquisition or 
alliance capability) and does not discuss how learning one dynamic capability might influence the learning 
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of others3. From a theoretical perspective, understanding the potential for concurrent learning of dynamic 
capabilities is important because this would help provide deeper insight into learning, knowledge, and 
experience transfer effects in activities of high strategic value. For example, scholars argue that 
acquisitions, alliances or country entry are not just important to strategy but may actually constitute the 
very essence of strategy for many firms (Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Furr, 2007). From a managerial 
perspective, learning how to develop multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently is important as using 
several capabilities together generates more shareholder value than emphasizing one in particular 
(Dranikoff, Koller, and Schneider, 2002). As one illustration, Shi and Prescott (2011) discovered that 
firms using both acquisitions and alliances to drive corporate development outperformed other firms who 
relied only on acquisitions. In summary, the literature lacks an in-depth, longitudinal study that explores 
whether firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently and how that learning might take place. 
METHODS 
To gain in-depth understanding of how firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently, we 
rely on the extended case method. This method uses an in-depth historical analysis of a single firm to 
reconceptualize, build and extend theory (Burawoy, 1998; Danneels, 2010) 4. The extended case method 
thus involves constant cycling between theory and data to help provide novel accounts of organizational 
behavior over a protracted period of time. In our study, we focus on the development of acquisition, joint 
venture (JV), and divestiture capabilities within Dow Chemical Corporation over multiple years.  
                                                 
3 Some recent work has started to address this gap by examining experience spillovers across activities. For example, 
Zollo and Reuer (2010) used data from the U.S. banking industry and found that alliance experience improves the 
performance of a focal acquisition when that acquisition is managed in ways that resemble the typical handling of an 
alliance. However, results from this large-scale empirical study suggest that firms might learn to manage alliances 
before they learn to manage acquisitions. Thus, it does not explicitly examine whether alliance and acquisition 
capabilities might be learned together and, if so, how. It also leaves unaddressed several other critical research 
questions, such as whether experience spillover effects are symmetric in both directions and whether, if at all, 
divestitures – often seen as the mirror image of acquisitions – might also influence alliance and acquisition outcomes. 
4 Examples of the extended case study in the organizational literature include Burgelman’s (1994) study of Intel’s 
successful movement from memory chips to microprocessors, Tripsas and Gavetti’s (2000) study of how Polaroid’s 
history hampered its ability to adapt to digital photography, Siggelkow’s (2002) study of the gradual evolution of 
strategy in the mutual fund giant Vanguard, and Danneels’ (2010) study of how Smith Corona, a leading 
manufacturer of typewriters, altered its resource base in response to technological shifts in its industry. 
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Founded in 1897, chemist Herbert Henry Dow used electrochemistry to convert the brine underneath 
Midland, Michigan into bromine. The bromine was then used to form bleach that could be sold 
commercially. The firm began its own sales department in 1904 and started building up its agricultural 
chemical business. By the 1990s, Dow had built up a successful portfolio of chemistries and advanced 
materials agro-sciences that were sold in products and solutions to customers in more than 150 countries 
and sectors spanning from agriculture to electronics, water and energy. Yet, while the chemicals industry 
as a whole had enjoyed rapid growth for almost 50 years, by the turn of the century the industry faced a 
series of environmental challenges.  Traditional chemical companies such as Dow faced changes in 
feedstock availability and price, rising energy costs and demand shifts from Triad to Asian countries 
(Heimeriks and Gates, 2010).  Moreover, global demand for basic chemicals (e.g., polymers and 
petrochemicals used for rubber and plastics products) was stable though margins decreased due to 
maturing products and consolidation.  Instead, specialty chemicals (e.g., industrial gases and adhesives for 
coatings and industrial cleaning products) were becoming more attractive as they contained higher-margin 
products for a rapidly growing range of end markets.  Leading chemical companies (e.g., BASF, Bayer, 
Dupont, and Dow), therefore began to gradually shift their portfolio from predominantly lower-margin 
basic to higher-margin specialty chemicals.  For instance, Bayer gradually divested its oil and gas related 
units, while Dupont moved away from producing petrochemical products.  Likewise, Dow discontinued 
producing chemicals for pharma and started reducing its exposure to basic petrochemicals. 
Dow Chemical lends itself well to a case study of dynamic capability development for several 
reasons. First, key decision makers involved in the formalization of acquisition, JV, and divestiture 
activity were present in the firm at the time of data collection. On average, these individuals had almost 30 
years of experience working with Dow and could therefore provide an accurate and rich, in-depth 
perspective on acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures from the time the firm started enacting efforts to become 
more effective in doing them. Second, the chemical industry in which Dow operates is attractive for this 
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study because of the need to acquire, partner, and divest over time in order to grow and survive (Dow 
Annual Reports, 2010-2012). Third, because Dow archived its documents for managing acquisitions, JVs, 
and divestitures, we have a historical trail of what was created as well as when and how it was to be used. 
As such, data for each process can be isolated, enabling single and multi-process analysis. Fourth, Dow 
had entered into at least one hundred acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures at the time of data collection, 
which ensures sufficient experience with which to examine how the firm has been purposefully modifying 
its resource base over time. Finally, as Dow is a publicly traded organization, financial statements, stock-
market return data, and press releases are available to help us analyze how well the capabilities perform. 
We rely on three data sources: (1) quantitative and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews 
with company leaders; (2) quantitative data from company and public sources on Dow’s acquisition, JV, 
and divestiture performance; and (3) archival data including company intranet documents, business 
publications, and other materials produced by the firm. A primary data source was the semi-structured 
interviews with informants directly responsible for corporate development (see Table 2 for more 
information about informants). Each interview consisted of three parts: (1) background of the firm and the 
importance of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures; (2) event chronology for acquisitions, JVs, and/or 
divestitures; and (3) direct questions related to learning over time. For the event chronology, we asked 
open-ended questions that focused on the sequence of events (e.g., How, if at all, did your company start 
formalizing the acquisition process? What did you do first? What did you do next?). We then reviewed the 
actions of executives, and asked if we had covered all main activities. We also sent follow-up emails and 
conducted additional interviews. Finally, we triangulated interview data with observations and archival 
data to improve completeness (Jick, 1979). For example, we spent several days on site and were given 
access to several hundred pages of process-related documents created by Dow executives. These 
documents frequently took the form of Power Point presentations or manuals that detailed the overall flow 
of activity across a particular process (e.g., acquisition) as well as the more granular action steps 
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associated with a particular phase of a process (e.g., due diligence or implementation). Together, 
supplementing interview data with archival data and relying on very knowledgeable informants (with an 
average of 30 years of experience at Dow) helps mitigate informant bias5.  
Our analysis involved looking for the emergence of similar themes and relationships related to 
learning across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
From the emerging patterns, we formed tentative theoretical constructs. We then refined them by 
revisiting the data to compare and verify the occurrence of specific learning mechanisms. Given the 
literature’s focus on learning from more and similar experience, pacing of experience, and codification, 
we examined the data for these constructs. However, we also looked for unexpected constructs, thus 
combining theory elaboration and theory generation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Lee, 1999) in our analysis. 
We then iterated between theory, data, and extant research until a strong match appeared between the data 
and our theoretical framework (see Figures 1 and 2). 
CONCURRENT LEARNING OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
Our data show that Dow learned acquisition, JV and divestiture capabilities concurrently. This 
organizational-level learning is taking place as indicated by changes in behavior (Argote and Miron-
Spektor, 2011) as it relates to Dow’s Program Management Office (to be discussed) and the activities they 
are engaged in. We first describe how Dow learned acquisition, JV, and divestiture capabilities 
concurrently. We then discuss how well these capabilities perform. 
Initiating structure 
Research suggests that knowledge codification helps in developing dynamic capabilities (Kale and 
Singh, 2002; Zollo and Winter, 2002). But, this work provides little understanding of how such 
                                                 
5 We also attempted to mitigate informant bias by combining both real-time and retrospective data; that is, Dow not 
only had a rich history of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, but was also engaged in numerous new acquisitions, JVs, 
and divestitures at the time of data collection. Such a combination is attractive because the retrospective data enables 
efficient data collection of more observations (thus enabling better grounding), whereas real-time data collection 
allows for further in-depth insight into learning (Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
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codification comes to exist since empirical research only assesses whether codified knowledge (e.g., 
manuals or checklists) exists. Our study contributes by suggesting that the nature and order of codification 
is consequential for dynamic capability development. We find that Dow executives began the concurrent 
learning of multiple dynamic capabilities by “initiating structure”. “Initiating structure” emerged from our 
data and is defined as the formation of a dedicated corporate group that begins knowledge codification. 
Hence, our definition of structure is consistent with others who define it broadly as constraint on action 
(Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009)6. Figure 2 and Table 3 show how “initiating structure” occurred 
from 1999 to 2002 and involves (1) creating a dedicated group and initial codified templates, (2) making 
the templates more granular, and then (3) continually updating the templates. 
Creating a dedicated group and initial codified templates: 
 Dow created a dedicated group to begin knowledge codification in 1999 as it began the integration 
of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) – the company’s (and industry’s) largest acquisition up to that point 
in time.7 The group was called the Program Management Office (PMO). Rich Carlisle8, the person asked 
to head the PMO recalled, “At the time, my boss, the VP of Operations and a member of the board of 
directors, called me into his office and said ‘Rich, we would like you to head up the PMO.’ And I said 
‘What is the PMO?’ ‘The program management office.’ ‘What’s a program management office?’ He said, 
‘Rich, I don’t have a clue, but we talked to some consultants and they said we need one’” (RC). Rich had 
spent 25 years at Dow in manufacturing, operations and change management. Rich quickly hired three 
seasoned executives within Dow, each with about 15 years of experience in the firm, to help as PMO staff 
members. Rich added, “I brought in a finance person because I knew that we needed to keep track of cost 
synergies. I brought in a manufacturing and operations person because we knew at that time Union 
                                                 
6 Structure as constraint on action is consistent with other definitions of structure including the regulated norms (e.g., 
rules, communication patterns) that shape action of firm members and the regular patterns of organization (e.g., roles, 
policies, manuals) through which a firm is expected to be administered (Chandler, 1962 Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  
7 At the time of the announcement, which was August 1999, Dow was about a $19 billion company and Union 
Carbide was a $6 billion company. Dow was thus adding about 33 percent additional revenue into the company. 
8 Pseudonyms are used to ensure anonymity. Initials at the end of a quote refer to an informant listed in Table 2. 
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Carbide had a lot of manufacturing sites. I also brought in a computer person because we knew that we 
would need to set up Web sites, we need to be able to share information; special file servers, etc.” (RC). 
Between 1999 and 2001, when the Union Carbide deal closed, Rich and his group helped put 
together a plan for acquisition implementation. They first spoke to business unit and functional leaders at 
Dow. Although Dow had been involved in many acquisitions before the Union Carbide deal, at the time 
there was no codified documentation that synthesized lessons and insights from these groups to help shape 
the acquisition process. This resulted in lower-than-hoped-for outcomes.  A PMO Manager expounded, 
“We didn’t have any documentation prior to the Union Carbide deal. Before 1999, we managed more 
case-by-case; find whoever you can find. We did not have a standard methodology around 
implementation” (JP). The PMO Director added, “There was a lot of knowledge all over the place, but it 
was never in any central repository… Deals were being done but basically the way it would work is that 
you’d have the folks doing the negotiations and all of a sudden they said ‘We’ve just acquired a company.’ 
There was no planning as far as what’s the integration, what’s the implementation. It was a fire drill. 
Nobody knew what the hell was going on” (RC). 
One of the first codified documents the PMO created for managing acquisitions detailed team 
structures. In the fall of 1999, Rich and his group outlined the different teams that would be involved in 
the Union Carbide acquisition implementation. One was cross-functional teams that would work together 
to ensure a smooth integration of the acquired company9. He said, “We put together a very good team 
structure at the very beginning of Union Carbide and that served us well and was the model that we used 
as we moved forward whether it was JVs, divestitures, or additional acquisitions” (RC). 
Other codified tools were created soon thereafter. The PMO produced documentation for “on-
boarding”. This provided instruction for integrating acquired employees. The PMO also produced 
                                                 
9 As an example of cross-functional teams, consider the case of getting a new ID badge for acquired employees. The 
ID badge has a number on it (the employee number) which is obtained from human resources. But then for the ID 
badges to work properly, they need to be linked to a company’s computer systems. And public affairs is responsible 
for taking the photos of the individual. So, three different functions are needed: HR, IT, and public affairs. 
  
 
Ǥ
documentation that specified timelines in the acquisition process. Rich recalled, “We needed an overall 
roadmap to try to guide the firm. You could just envision there were thousands and thousands of different 
tasks that needed to be accomplished to fully integrate Carbide into Dow. And so that was the reason for 
putting together this high-level timeline.” (RC). Finally, because the Union Carbide deal was tied to the 
promise of synergies, the PMO put together tools to help measure synergies along the way. Regarding 
these first codified tools Rich observed, “Specifying team structure, trying to put together a good on-
boarding program, setting overall timelines and then helping with synergy estimation. Those were really 
the first key codified tools that we started working on” (RC). 
Making initial templates more granular:  
After initially creating generic codified tools (e.g., team structures, overall timelines, on-boarding 
detail), Dow then began creating more function-specific codified tools (see codified knowledge in 
“initiating structure” in Figure 2). The PMO had originally not codified function-specific information 
given that the role of the PMO was to supply generic templates. Rich explained, “And as far as the reason 
why we didn’t initially put together the detailed functional information in our plan was the fact that we 
had a lot of subject matter experts and their responsibility was to put together the detailed integration 
plan for their specific function, whether it was R&D or manufacturing or purchasing, etc.” (RC). 
Moreover, the functional representatives from Dow involved in acquisitions were working part-time on 
the acquisitions, in addition to their other corporate responsibilities, and so did not have the time and 
resources like the individuals within the PMO to focus exclusively on codifying knowledge. With some 
knowledge captured in codified documents, Rich and his PMO group began to function as coaches to 
business unit leaders who came to them wanting to capture an acquisition opportunity but with little or no 
experience doing them. The head of the PMO said, “The business leader obviously knew the business… 
But, in general, that business leader probably had never done an acquisition… They were basically 
clueless as far as, ‘Ok, how do we do this?’ This is where the PMO coach or the PMO leader came into 
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play. He or she was the expert regarding the tools, the templates, the methodology, where the pitfalls 
would be, etc. And having those two people plan and work side by side was absolutely critical” (RC). 
Continually updating the templates:  
After Rich and his team started coaching business unit leaders, they also started performing after-
action reviews. These reviews became the main means to update codified tools and methodologies. Rich 
said, “What we did when we were done with the transaction was have an after-action review. This would 
be the PMO, the business leader and some of the other key players in that transaction. We would review 
what worked and what did not work. And then we would take that learning and infuse that into our 
methodology, infuse that into the tools and templates so that the methodology and the templates we had 
were basically evergreen. We really didn’t want them to get stagnant. We wanted to constantly improve on 
those tools” (RC).  After-action reviews occurred in a large-group format, where the PMO joined with 
most functional leaders to discuss actions and outcomes. After-action reviews also occurred via one-on-
one reviews with key functional leaders like human resources, finance, safety, or manufacturing since “the 
success or failure of the acquisition is so dependent upon those specific functions.” 
How initiating structure contributes to concurrent learning: 
Overall, we find that initiating structure facilitates the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities. One 
reason is that the formation of a dedicated group (a PMO in our case) to start codification focuses 
attention and provides coherence and direction. Having a dedicated group synchronizes geographically 
dispersed and functionally diverse work groups with each other. This lowers the likelihood of confusion, 
fatigue, and wasted effort, and it allows organization members to regulate the tempo of their actions and 
allocate time and resources accordingly (Martin, 2011). As the PMO Director commented, “The reason 
why we formed the PMO was to make sure that we have good alignment with all of our M&A activities, 
functions, and with the corporate strategy” (RC). A PMO Project Manager added, “We clarified touch 
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points, roles, and responsibilities” (AJ). Without a dedicated group, like the PMO, to coordinate activity, 
firm members may overlap in roles and thus become confused about what to do and when.  
The formation of a dedicated group also saves time. The group’s creation of initial codified tools 
speeds capability creation as it allows executives to build off the past. For example, the PMO Director 
remarked how the timeline for acquisitions made future acquisitions more efficient: “Speed is so critical 
in an acquisition… So when we announced [acquisition target], we pulled that timeline off the shelf, I put 
the name on top, I made a couple other tweaks here and there and we had it within 24 hours” (RC). A 
PMO Project Manager concurred, “Acquisitions follow a fairly similar path, so documenting those and 
being able to pull that off the shelf is helpful. That’s probably the key advantage. You’re not reinventing 
the wheel… That enables us to move a lot more quickly, a lot more efficiently, a lot more effectively than 
we had prior” (JP). Codification may therefore be particularly foundational to dynamic capabilities in less 
or moderately dynamic industries where efficiencies exist from using common action steps, since prior 
theoretical and empirical research suggests that less codified structures like ‘simple rules’ or ‘heuristics’ 
are foundational to dynamic capabilities in highly dynamic environments where executing common action 
steps becomes problematic (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011).  
Finally, the creation of a dedicated group that begins knowledge codification limits errors. The 
dedicated group formulates rough initial structure for how organization members should act. This reduces 
mistakes.  As support, the PMO Director stated, “Prior to 1999, we didn’t have a core group. Whenever 
there was an M&A deal, you just grabbed whoever. So no one was really trying to focus those resources” 
(RC). We find that the dedicated group first creates generic (vs function-specific) structure. In our study, 
initial generic structure took the form of codified tools about team structures, on-boarding detail, overall 
timelines, implementation milestones, and performance metrics and tracking (see evolution of codified 
knowledge in Figure 2). These initial codified documents help facilitate the creation of capabilities, since 
they channel the efforts of firm members into higher-level activities that are relevant to multiple deals, not 
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just one. Thus, while the PMO was initially formed to help manage a focal acquisition (UCC), members of 
the PMO quickly began to see that they were developing lessons that could apply to many future 
acquisitions. One PMO leader involved remembered, “We were very specifically formed to do the Carbide 
deal, period. Once we did that, we went to management and said, ‘We have some capability here, do you 
want to keep us around to work on other acquisitions?’ The answer came back, ‘yes!’” (JP). 
Generalizing structure 
 
Research on capabilities suggests the need for maintaining a dedicated corporate function to oversee 
a particular process. For example, Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) found that firms with a dedicated alliance 
function (a dedicated group of individuals overseeing alliances) performed better in their alliances than 
firms that did not have a dedicated alliance function. While our first finding on initiating structure also 
suggests the importance of a dedicated corporate function for developing one dynamic capability in 
isolation (e.g., acquisition capability) our second finding suggests the importance of transitioning 
dedicated corporate functions to non-dedicated ones to help firms develop multiple dynamic capabilities in 
parallel. In particular, we find that after Dow leaders set up a PMO (program management office) and the 
PMO created some codified tools for acquisition implementation (1999-2002), the PMO then began using 
those same codified tools for JVs and divestitures (2003-2005). We label this activity “generalizing 
structure”. Generalizing structure emerged from the data and is defined as a firm leveraging initial 
structure for one process (e.g., acquisition) into multiple processes (e.g., JV and divestiture) concurrently. 
Figure 2 and Table 4 show how “generalizing structure” involves (1) generalizing structure developed for 
one process into multiple processes and (2) strengthening communication.  
Generalizing structure developed for one process into multiple processes: 
 
Through 2002, Dow’s PMO focused on the implementation of acquisitions. But, in 2003, acquisition 
activity slowed down and corporate management asked the PMO to help codify knowledge for how to 
implement JVs (see Figure 2). The PMO Director recalled: “We expanded into JVs in 2003…all of the 
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discipline that we had developed and learned with Union Carbide, we just turned around and applied that 
to those JVs” (RC). Similarly, a PMO leader added that once the PMO demonstrated its value for 
facilitating acquisition implementations, senior executives at Dow were able to see how “leveraging that 
expertise” to facilitate implementation in JVs made strategic sense. 
As PMO leaders began to see similarities between the implementation of acquisitions and the 
implementation of JVs they also began to see the similarities between the implementation of acquisitions 
and the implementation of divestitures. An IT manager involved with the PMO noted the broad link 
among them when he said, “When we acquire, and we go through implementation, you could somewhat 
put those items in reverse on the divestiture side” (MP).  Hence, after applying the codified tools from 
acquisition implementation to JV implementation starting in 2003, Dow continued to learn by applying the 
same codified tools to divestitures in 2004. There were two specific drivers of this timing. One was that, 
as a result of Union Carbide, Dow was forced to do some divestitures because of FTC concerns. The other 
driver was that 2004 marked the beginning of a major business downturn. The firm thus needed cash to 
pay off the debt from Union Carbide. Hence, Dow began applying its acquisition implementation 
documents (e.g., team structures, on-boarding detail, timelines, function-specific plans) to divestitures 
starting in 2004. A PMO Manager noted: “So pretty much whether we are doing acquisitions or 
divestitures or JVs, we all form cross-functional teams” (JP). He continued, “The reason we are involved 
in JVs and divestitures besides acquisitions is that the same processes and the types of individuals you 
need to bring onto these teams are the same types of folks that are involved with M&As. In that regard it 
has worked exceedingly well” (JP). The PMO Director said, “We started working just on acquisitions. 
And shortly thereafter executive management said, ‘Would you look at JVs?’ Shortly thereafter we had a 
lot of divestiture activity and so our capabilities just kept growing” (RC). 
Strengthening communication: 
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The value of cross-functional communication, initiated for acquisitions in early 2002, became re-
emphasized as Dow began to formalize its knowledge for JVs (2003) and divestitures (2004-2005). The 
PMO Director said: “What we found then was that with JVs and divestitures there were so many cross-
functional interdependencies that we needed to be able to have cross-functional teams, and we needed to 
have an overall roadmap and communication so that people understood the overall sequencing as we 
move forward, whether it’s an acquisition, JV, or a divestiture” (RC). While Dow continued to rely on 
cross-functional teams for acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures PMO leaders noticed that the amount of 
communication across the cross-functional teams evolved – i.e., it increased at the start of a deal and 
decreased towards the end. At the start, the cross-functional team would meet several times a week to put 
together the overall plan, and ensure everybody understood timelines and responsibilities. But, once they 
had their plan, cross-functional teams would meet every three or four weeks. At the end of the deal 
(implementation phase) the time was lengthened such that cross-functional teams only met monthly.  
Dow also strengthened communication through after-action reviews. To further develop their 
codified tools, PMO leaders started sending surveys to those involved in JVs and divestitures, and then 
conducting extensive one-on-one interviews with those individuals to understand survey insights and 
answers. These changes in behavior provide further evidence of learning. The PMO Director explained:  
“I think when we started to codify it, you obviously codify what you know. But once we do that, we then 
have the opportunity to sit back and say, are we missing something? As an example, we have put together 
a joint venture strategic guidance document. The way that we assembled it is, first of all we send them a 
questionnaire and ask them what went well, what are the areas of improvement. We then follow up with 
one-on-one interviews with the individuals. I had about 100 interviews of Dow leaders who work for joint 
ventures. So I would come into your office and you would tell what you knew about joint ventures. And 
actually what we found is that there was a wealth of information but once we assembled it there were 
some gaps, there were obvious things that needed to be addressed but we didn’t have anything. So that is 
when we said, we need to develop some tools or templates or processes to try to address those gaps…[this 
is now our process] whether we are doing a joint venture, an acquisition, or a divestiture” (RC). 
 
How generalizing structure contributes to concurrent learning: 
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Overall, we find that generalizing structure fosters the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities 
concurrently. One reason is that it allows the recurrent use of knowledge. Scholars contend that 
acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures relate to one another, as they are alternative ways to shape firm 
boundaries, with divestitures and JVs being ways of contracting them, and acquisitions and JVs being 
ways of expanding them (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). Plus, one can be the flip side of another; an 
acquisition for one firm often represents a divestiture for another. Given links among JVs, acquisitions and 
divestitures, PMO managers felt that lessons gained in acquisition implementation were generalizable 
beyond acquisitions. One stated, “We understood that there would be some commonality in the other 
processes, namely JVs and divestitures, but it took us a while to build that experience” (JP). Similarly, the 
PMO Director said, “We took a lot of the documents, the templates that we had used with Union Carbide 
(acquisition) and then modified those for JVs and likewise for divestitures” (RC).  This role of the PMO in 
making modifications not only provides evidence of learning (via changes in behavior) but also suggests 
that while codified knowledge is helpful for effective experience transfer, it alone may be insufficient. 
More broadly, generalizing structure improves the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities 
concurrently because it helps executives create expertise across multiple areas concurrently. Keeping 
constant the PMO members while changing the deal type facilitates learning as PMO members can readily 
identify similarities and differences across projects. This increases opportunities for positive experience 
transfer (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). As the PMO Director explained, “It’s all those types of things 
that start building on each other and you say: ‘Ah, there is something I just learned from a JV that maybe 
I can apply next time I do a divestiture or next time I do an acquisition.’ So there is tremendous 
commonality regarding some of the work process discipline that we’ve developed and that we use” (RC).  
Finally, generalizing structure allows for concurrent learning because it maintains momentum in the 
development of dynamic capabilities. Since practice with one process is often relatively sporadic (e.g., 
low rate of acquisitions), taking codified knowledge for implementation in one process (e.g., acquisitions) 
  
 
Ǥ
and testing it out in related processes (e.g., JVs and divestitures) speeds the accumulation of experience 
and allows leaders to quickly understand the usefulness of initial codified tools. A PMO Project Manager 
stated, “We did take advantage if there were downtimes relative to acquisitions to focus on codifying and 
documenting our processes and taking what we began to learn from acquisitions and apply that as we 
started to do JVs” (JP). Likewise, another PMO Project Manager corroborated, “Greenfield JVs, where 
you start from nothing and you build something, was not something that the group really had targeted for, 
but when asked, they just stepped into that space. And so I think you take whatever opportunity early on 
that you have to fill voids that the business would have, to see how the methodology could apply in ways 
that really you hadn’t contemplated but works pretty well” (AJ). 
Backward-chaining structure 
Empirical work suggests that capabilities are likely to be developed as leaders codify knowledge for 
each phase of a corporate development process – i.e., the transaction phase, the due diligence phase, and 
the implementation phase (Kale and Singh, 2007; Zollo and Singh, 2004). But, this work is silent on the 
order in which phases are codified and why that order may be important for capability development. Our 
work suggests that learning multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently is facilitated when firms codify 
phases in reverse chronological order, not in chronological order as might be implicitly assumed. We term 
this activity “backward-chaining structure.” Backward-chaining structure emerged from the data and is 
defined as starting codification with the last phase and then working back to the first phase. We find that 
the PMO started codifying documents for the implementation phase of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures. 
This focused attention on the phase that is often considered the most critical and most complex, but that is 
also associated with many mistakes (Graebner, 2002). The PMO then codified the due diligence phase for 
acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures - the phase before implementation. Finally, the PMO codified the 
transaction phase for acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures - the phase before due diligence and the first phase 
chronologically. Figure 2 and Table 5 detail this finding and show how backward-chaining structure 
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involves (1) sequencing codification based on importance and complexity as well as unmet firm needs, 
and (2) enhancing knowledge transfer via coaching and cross-fertilization.  
Sequencing codification based on importance, complexity and unmet organizational needs:  
Several studies identify the implementation phase of acquisitions as the most complex and critical 
phase influencing acquisition performance (Heimeriks, Schijven, & Gates, 2012; Larson & Finkelstein, 
1999)10. Likewise, we find that before 2006 Dow’s top management saw implementation as the key phase 
of acquisitions, JVs and divestitures and so focused exclusively on codifying knowledge for this phase. 
The PMO Director noted, “Our role is to make business unit heads successful. It’s really about the 
understanding and the vision as far as how are you going to implement something.” 
In 2006, the PMO group began to see a need for its expertise outside of the implementation phase. 
Leaders noticed that the due diligence phase in acquisitions, JVs and divestitures lacked process 
discipline. Said the PMO Director, “And the person in charge of the deal would say, ‘Well, I guess we 
have to do a due diligence. Who do we need?’ And it was not coordinated. They had no idea who to even 
contact. There was no process discipline, they didn’t have a checklist, they didn’t train people…They had 
never done a due diligence. In fact, they couldn’t even spell due diligence” (RC). This lack of process 
discipline and codified tools caused the firm problems. The Director of the PMO recounted, “As an 
example we bought a company. And actually when we went in after we acquired it, and this is before my 
group was engaged, there was not a lot of due diligence done but our executive management really just 
wanted to do this deal and it turned out terrible. We have either shut down or divested every piece of it 
because it was a flawed strategy, there was nothing there” (RC).  
Just as the PMO group began to see how implementation tools created for acquisitions were relevant 
to JVs and divestitures, so they began to see how due diligence tools, such as corporate and function-
                                                 
10 For example, the implementation phase for a large acquisition involves coordinating hundreds of professionals and 
touches every operational aspect of the company, while the transaction phase involves as few people as possible (it is 
confidential), and touches hardly any operational aspect of the company. 
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specific due diligence checklists and value assessment documents, had relevance for all three deal types. 
Given their credibility and experience, the PMO offered to oversee the due diligence phase, rather than 
just the implementation phase, for acquisitions, JVs, and divestments. This proposed action met little 
resistance within Dow because it not only exploited the knowledge base of the PMO but also addressed a 
critical need. The PMO Director said, “Frankly, it was such a pain for our business and corporate leaders 
to put together a due diligence team that they welcomed anybody who was willing to help them pull 
together those groups of individuals” (RC).  The Director added, “We said, ‘Hey, guys, we have the time, 
we have this experience and can take the lead on due diligence. We’ll make sure that we get the right 
people, we get the right function at the right time and make sure that their people are trained and that they 
have the appropriate checklists and that they know what to do from a due diligence standpoint.’” (RC).  
Dow’s top management team authorized the PMO to begin codifying tools for the due diligence 
phase of acquisitions, JVs and divestitures. This additional evidence of learning was described by a PMO 
Project Manager who noted the movement from codifying implementation tools for acquisitions, JVs, and 
divestitures to codifying due diligence tools for acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures. He said, “We first 
engaged in the acquisition integration phase. After we documented that phase we created and worked on 
the JV process and what we call the JV guidance document. We then put together our divestiture process 
and divestiture guidance document...We used our implementation expertise across the three types 
(acquisition, JV, divestiture). Then we saw a place for ourselves in the due diligence phase” (JP). Another 
senior leader added more detail about how something that was learned doing due diligence for acquisitions 
was subsequently applied in JVs when he commented, “We have codified our due diligence process and 
due diligence checklists when we do acquisitions. We would apply basically those same processes and 
checklists in a JV if a partner we’re getting together with is contributing their own manufacturing assets 
and intellectual property assets. We use those same due diligence checklists or similar, when we would 
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look at those things that the party brings to the JV. Much like when we would look at those if we were 
looking to fully acquire a 100% acquisition” (SS). 
As the PMO gained competence and credibility for handling both the implementation and due 
diligence phases of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, it saw an opportunity to further extend its role into 
the transaction phase – the phase preceding the due diligence phase and one that also had unmet firm 
needs.  Part of the value of having the PMO assist with and create codified tools for the transaction phase 
(in addition to tools for the implementation and due diligence phases) came from the high level of 
turnover in the people working in the transaction phase, which made capturing lessons from the past 
difficult. The PMO Director recollected, “There was a tremendous turnover of people in the transaction 
phase. You’d have the corporate director of M&A who’s responsible for the transaction. He or she will 
only be there for two years and then move on to another job and then they would bring somebody else 
then who had never had any experience. So there was really a lack of process discipline” (RC). Further, 
the personnel in charge of the transaction phase at Dow seemed to place less emphasis on capturing 
knowledge. Instead, they appeared to be more concerned with timely execution. The PMO Director 
remembered, “The finance guys don’t have a really good appreciation of some of the operations issues 
that we run into. They’re not as process-oriented. They worry about doing the deal and then they move on 
to the next, whereas our group is a lot more into trying to capture the knowledge” (RC). 
Because of the PMO’s reputation, the PMO was able to help Dow address an unmet need in the 
transaction phase. Hence, in 2007, after codifying tools for the implementation phase and the due 
diligence phase, the PMO started to codify tools for the transaction phase. The PMO Director said, “We 
started to codify some of the things that our transaction people were doing” (RC). Another PMO leader 
added, “We talk about acquisitions, JVs, divestitures and we talk about phases of each– transaction 
phase, due diligence phase, and implementation phase. So each type has all three of those phases. Phase-
wise, we first developed our expertise in implementation. Then, we were ‘moving upstream’. We became 
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leaders of the due diligence phase of acquisition, JV, divestiture. Now we support the transaction phase” 
(JP). 
These tools included a transaction proposal, a business support document, a negotiations template, board 
approval guidelines, and documents detailing how to perform a post-process review (see codified 
knowledge under Transaction tools in Figure 2). A PMO Manager involved elaborated, “Our focus was 
acquisitions first, and we were just focusing on the implementation of the acquisitions. Then we segued 
into JVs… then, we went into divestitures, and then we started saying: ‘not only can our group help with 
the implementation but why don’t you let us drive and lead the due diligence effort?’ So we do the due 
diligence for acquisitions, we do due diligence for JVs, we assemble all the information for due diligence 
on divestitures. Then more and more we’re spending time working with the transaction teams11” (JP).   
Enhancing knowledge transfer through coaching and cross-fertilization: 
As the PMO gained experience across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures and across deal phases 
(implementation, due diligence, and transaction), it gained expertise managing any type and facet of those 
deals. This increased the PMO’s ability to transfer knowledge across the firm. One way this occurred was 
through improved coaching of business unit leaders and functional leaders who lacked experience in 
acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures. An information systems (IS) functional leader recounted: 
“They call Rich with a new deal. Rich launches a team with his direct staff, which includes his project 
leaders and the functional leaders – I am one of the functional leaders and I’m invited to participate as 
the IS central point for the PMO… I am in a coaching and counseling mode for IS managers as they go 
through the steps of the methodology… One of my roles is to have a monthly meeting with each of the 
business IS managers who are on projects to discuss where they are in the methodology. That 
communication is one way how we are constantly reinforcing the use of the methodology” (TW). 
 
                                                 
11 Backward-chaining structure assumes a reverse chronological pattern. Dow also started from the most important phase 
(implementation) and then worked backwards. Likewise, Dow moved from the most complex phase (i.e., implementation 
phase where the PMO had more operational issues and people to coordinate) to the least complex (i.e., transaction phase 
where there are fewer operational issues and people to coordinate). While these patterns appeared to coincide for Dow, 
future research is needed to understand if backward-chaining relates equally to time, importance, and complexity.   
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Another PMO Project Manager supported this view. She detailed her ongoing coaching with 
functional leaders within business units looking to acquire, joint venture, or divest. Said she, “It’s an 
ongoing dialogue. So I’ll be with an HR representative from a business unit and be their shadow all along 
the way. And they will create things like an HR strategy document, an HR internal due diligence 
document, a document that states ‘here are our desired starting positions for negotiations,’ an 
implementation plan. That person will create those things, but I’m doing the support all along the way. So 
they’ll create it, I’ll look at it, we’ll sit down and talk about it … they’ve got a project, and a coach 
assigned to them and you work it together. Issues come up, questions come up, the unexpected comes up, 
and you have a dialogue around that to help them think through what they would do” (AJ). 
Through their coaching, PMO leaders also encouraged knowledge transfer by promoting cross-
functional communication within business units. This occurred in several ways. First, the PMO initiated a 
hand-over meeting from the due diligence team to the implementation team. Here, all of the insights from 
each of the functions in the due diligence phase are communicated. Second, the PMO made sure 
functional people that are handing over due diligence information to the implementation team did not 
disappear but rather remained on the steering team for the implementation project and involved in 
consulting for another three to twelve months to ensure a smooth implementation. The continuity of 
functional leaders across phases mitigated knowledge loss since Dow employees frequently moved from 
one assignment and team to another. A PMO IS functional leader stated this benefit when he said, “We 
can document as much as we can in our methodology... But losing that key person who has that 
experience with the deal and some of the softer points of the deal, that’s a problem. So we try to keep key 
people in there throughout the steering team part of the implementation project. That is something that 
has evolved over time” (TW).  Collectively, our data on the PMO’s coaching provide further evidence of 
learning and also suggest that codified knowledge alone is inadequate for successful knowledge transfer. 
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Knowledge transfer also occurred through the cross-fertilization of ideas within the PMO.  As PMO 
members were located close together and were connected through shared goals and activities, Dow’s PMO 
appeared to meet the formal definition of a group (Edmondson, 2002). Consequently, PMO members 
frequently communicated with each other to share insights as they gained experience across deal types. 
Importantly, this activity allowed knowledge to move from an individual level to a collective level. One 
senior PMO member at Dow stated, “We have folks that are experienced with all three project types and 
they can leverage their experience in one type and apply it to another. Then we have sharing from PMO 
project manager to PMO project manager so we keep that learning alive. And we keep that capability 
strong. So aside from the documentation, there is a very important aspect of people in all of this and 
having that continuity and experience across multiple project managers here is highly valuable” (SS). 
Communication among PMO members helped indicate which codified tools needed updating. While 
the updating of tool did not account for as much time as it did when the PMO was created in 1999, it still 
was an important element of each PMO member’s responsibilities. As one PMO functional leader stated, 
“Part of my responsibility as a functional leader in the PMO is to keep the tools updated… In the times of 
PMO formation, we created templates as we were running projects. That was around 40 percent of our 
time. Today, updating takes 5-10 percent of my time, including evaluation with the project team” (TW). 
How backward-chaining structure contributes to concurrent learning: 
Overall, we find that backward-chaining structure is another activity that facilitates the learning of 
multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently. One reason is that acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures can all be 
organized in terms of similar phases: transaction, due diligence, and implementation. A PMO manager 
stated, “We divide all our processes in three phases… The transaction phase – target identification, 
negotiation, document phase with lawyers, getting the agreements in place, etc. Second, due diligence. 
When we are buying, we need due diligence, and when we are divesting we need to do an internal due 
diligence to prepare information for potential buyers. Third, implementation” (JP). 
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A second reason backward-chaining structure helps facilitate concurrent learning is that working on 
documentation for common phases across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures allows leaders to better see 
how lessons from one process may be transferred to another. Dow’s PMO Director said, “Sometimes, 
when we’re doing a divestiture, there are some things that we can learn on the acquisition side and vice 
versa.” (RC). For example, acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures all benefited from using a “white paper 
document12” in the transaction phase. Whereas with acquisitions and JVs the white paper document 
specifies the motivation for resource integration, in the case of divestitures it outlines the motivation for 
resource de-integration. Another executive explained: “We have a white paper template…as you’re going 
through acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures, you’re going to say: ‘That looks pretty similar. I saw that with 
acquisitions or JVs or divestitures. There is commonality across these different types of processes” (RC). 
Finally, backward-chaining structure further fosters the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities 
because it gradually increases the centrality and applicability of the PMO. The PMO Director 
summarized: “My goal for my staff was that those individuals would be able to do acquisitions, 
divestitures, or JVs. I did not try to have one person just only focused on JVs or one only focused on 
acquisitions because I really felt there was tremendous value for a member of the PMO to understand all 
three” (RC).  The implication is that as groups like Dow’s PMO extend their structure across different 
phases (e.g., transaction, due diligence, and implementation), they can better coordinate the development 
of dynamic capabilities concurrently because they create continuities between phases. That is, often when 
firms engage in acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures the present and future become disconnected. Some 
executives concentrate on the transaction phase, while others focus on the due diligence phase or 
implementation phase. Backward-chaining brings the present and future together in orderly ways that help 
firms get into a cadence and create guidance for action that is both powerful and efficient. Regarding this, 
a senior PMO leader stated, “We’re engaged in all those activities all the time. Our project managers are 
                                                 
12 A “white paper” is an informational document that explicates the strategic rationale, key value drivers, and risks for 
a particular deal. 
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multi-capable with respect to managing any type of those projects” (SS).  The PMO Director added, “One 
of the beauties of having my group involved in due diligence is we’re also involved with driving 
implementation…We’ve really tried to improve the linkage between transaction, due diligence and 
implementation.” 
The performance effects of Dow’s dynamic capabilities 
Thus far, we have focused on how Dow created multiple dynamic capabilities in parallel. We have 
also avoided the tautology of equating a capability with its performance by first ascertaining the 
characteristics of Dow’s capabilities and how they developed (i.e., initiating structure, generalizing 
structure, and backward-chaining structure) without assessing performance. We now assess how well 
Dow’s dynamic capabilities perform in terms of technical and evolutionary fitness. 
Technical fitness denotes “how effectively a capability performs its intended function” (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2009: 97-98). We assessed technical fitness through qualitative statements of informants (see 
Table 6A). These statements emerged without prompting, as executives described the performance of 
acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures. Examples include, “If I look back at the last 10 years, we’ve enabled 
some consistencies across different types of M&As with definitely a lot of the implementations moving 
faster than we’ve ever done before,” and “Deep down inside I believe our performance improved in 
divestitures.” Broadly, leaders felt that their JVs, acquisitions, and divestitures were largely performing 
their intended functions. As the PMO Director said, “I have been participating in The Conference Board 
for seven to eight years and sitting around the table, listening to how other companies work on 
acquisitions or JVs or divestitures, what they were doing and what they were struggling with. I personally 
believe Dow was in the top tier” (RC). Additional qualitative data suggests that Dow’s dynamic 
capabilities are self-reinforcing as the ability to do acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures seemed to improve 
when done together. As the head of the PMO stated, “Dow’s ability to perform acquisitions or JVs or 
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divestitures absolutely improved by doing the other deal types” (RC). In sum, our data appear to provide 
evidence of technical fitness. 
After assessing technical fitness, we then assessed evolutionary fitness. Evolutionary fitness denotes 
“how well a dynamic capability enables an organization to make a living by creating, extending, or 
modifying its resource base” (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009: 97-98; see also Helfat et al., 2007: 7). Stock 
market returns are useful measures of evolutionary fitness since they reflect investor forecasts of future 
financial returns and so reflect how well the capabilities (are likely to) enable firms to make a living from 
these capabilities. Accordingly, we assess evolutionary fitness through a quantitative event study (see 
Table 6B). We used Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum database to look up all the acquisitions, JVs, and 
divestitures that Dow had engaged in between 1990 and 2010. We gathered stock-market data from the 
CRSP database and computed the abnormal returns associated with each of these events. Finally, we used 
event-study methodology to assess for each acquisition, JV, and divestiture whether this performance 
measure tended to increase with experience and thus, whether our empirical setting exhibited evidence of 
a capability improving firm outcomes over time. Using event windows of three (-1,1), five (-2,2), seven (-
3,3), and nine (-4,4) days surrounding the announcement dates, we found consistent statistical patterns 
suggesting positive performance effects of experience in the context of acquisitions (p < .01), JVs (p < 
.001), and divestitures (p < .10).  Overall, our quantitative event study provides evidence of evolutionary 
fitness.  Together, assessments of technical and evolutionary fitness are important since they suggest that 
while all of Dow’s dynamic capabilities we studied (i.e., acquisitions, JVs and divestitures) seem to 
perform their intended function, these capabilities also seem to enable Dow to make a living from them. 
DISCUSSION 
Research in strategy indicates the importance of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007) and suggests that these capabilities are learned from experience. But 
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empirical work has invariably focused on a single dynamic capability in isolation, thus overlooking how 
firms might learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently. We explore this gap. 
Framework: Concurrent learning 
Our primary contribution is an emergent theoretical framework for how firms learn multiple 
dynamic capabilities concurrently (see Figures 1 and 2). First, concurrent learning starts as firms initiate 
structure. Dow created a Program Management Office (PMO), a dedicated group that began knowledge 
codification. While existing literature also highlights the role of codified knowledge in the creation of 
dynamic capabilities (e.g., Zollo and Winter, 2002), we add by showing how the order of creation appears 
to be consequential. The PMO first created generic documents for acquisition implementation (e.g., team 
structures and on-boarding detail) and then created more function-specific ones (e.g., HR strategy 
documents). This sequence helped the PMO generate documents relevant to future acquisitions vs. just the 
focal one in particular. Moreover, we find that the PMO complemented their codification with coaching to 
business unit and functional leaders to help them understand which codified tools to use and when. As a 
whole, the initial codified tools gave needed guidance and so helped Dow improve efficiency. Yet at the 
same time the PMO coaching helped the firm adjust to the idiosyncrasies of each particular event (e.g., 
each acquisition) and so helped Dow preserve flexibility. Together, these actions helped Dow extend its 
resource base by using acquisitions to strengthen its position in commodity chemicals. 
Second, concurrent learning continues as firms generalize structure. Existing research finds that 
executives often bias activity towards one particular growth process such as acquisitions or JVs (Argyres 
and Liebeskind, 1999; Folta and Miller, 2002). By contrast, we find that Dow created more symmetry than 
asymmetry across acquisition, JV, and divestiture experience since PMO leaders began to see how the 
structure used to shape acquisition implementation could also help guide implementation in JVs and 
divestitures. As one member of the PMO remarked, “At a high level, acquisitions follow a fairly similar 
path… It also became more explicit that the other processes follow a similar path” (JP). Hence, reuse of 
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knowledge occurred as knowledge gained from acquisition experience is not just specialized to future 
acquisitions. Rather, it is fungible and applicable to JVs and divestitures as well. This helped Dow modify 
and extend its resource base by using JVs and divestitures to carve out basic (commodity) chemicals. 
Finally, concurrent learning progresses by backward-chaining structure. Leaders codified knowledge 
for the most critical and complex phase of acquisitions, JVs and divestitures first and codified knowledge 
for the least complex phase last (see Figure 2). In our study, this occurred in reverse chronological order. 
PMO executives started codifying knowledge for the implementation phase of acquisitions, JVs, and 
divestitures and then expanded their role and began codifying knowledge for the due diligence phase of 
each. Last, PMO executives codified knowledge for the transaction phase of each. This order helped the 
PMO use JVs and divestitures to exit lower margin businesses and finance deals. In sum, our framework 
identifies how concurrent learning of dynamic capabilities occurs (see Figure 1). These dynamic 
capabilities in turn allowed Dow to purposefully modify its resource base by reducing activity in 
commodity chemicals and moving into specialty chemicals. 
Growth and massed versus distributed practice 
Our study contributes by shedding light on how firms might more effectively grow. Extant research 
finds that many firms skew their growth activity towards one particular growth process, such as 
acquisitions (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) or JVs (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Folta and Miller, 
2002). This outcome is not surprising given that firms are prone to repeat what they know how to do 
(Argote, 1999) and expanding activities too far beyond a core activity can hurt performance (Eggers, 
2012). In contrast, we find that growth may be enhanced when firms do not skew towards the use of one 
particular growth process, but rather use multiple ones in a balanced approach. Regarding this point, the 
head of Dow’s PMO commented, “We have a lot of deals closed in all three areas (acquisitions, JVs, and 
divestitures)… We’ve had as much experience on each of the three; I can’t say one area is more dominant 
than others” (RC). When a firm has some symmetry in its use of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, it can 
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more easily adjust and improve its “fit” with the external market. This is because the existing knowledge 
base of the firm restricts its growth opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). So, even though firms gain 
more from acquisitions by divesting excess, obsolete, or underperforming resources (Capron, 
Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 2001), if executives have little experience with divestitures, their change 
efforts will be limited. Therefore, while dynamic capabilities help firms purposefully modify their 
resource base, balancing acquisition, JV, and divestiture experience gives firms more degrees of freedom 
for how that modification can take place. 
We also contribute by providing a deeper understanding of the role of practice in the creation of 
dynamic capabilities. Most work on capability development implicitly advocates massed practice – that is, 
repeat practice with a particular process (e.g., Danneels, 2010; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 
2007). With massed practice the assumption is that executives focus on completing more repetitions with 
a particular process. More repetitions allow firm members time to draw inferences from the past and give 
them greater insight into the linkages between actions and outcomes such that firms can better leverage 
knowledge over time (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Helfat et al., 2007).  
Our study, alternatively, brings to light the value of distributed practice. With distributed practice, 
trials of one activity are broken up with periods of some other activity (Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, and 
Marangoni, 2003). We find evidence of distributed practice as Dow did not simply continue to amass 
acquisition experience to build an acquisition capability. Rather, it interspersed acquisition experience 
with JV and divestiture experience. As one leader observed, “We manage acquisitions, JVs, and 
divestitures concurrently.” Distributed practice is important because massed practice often leads to 
maladaptive specialization (March, 1991). Practice with one process leads a firm to accumulate more 
experience with it, thus making experience with other key processes (e.g., JVs and divestitures) 
inadequate to make them rewarding to use (Levitt and March, 1988). Distributed practice helps avoid 
maladaptive specialization and the problem of overcoming competencies firms have developed with 
  
 
Ǥ
earlier processes (Whetten, 1987). Interspersing JV experience with acquisition experience, for example, 
gave executives more associations for their ideas on acquisitions (and vice versa). Other research also 
supports the relative benefits of distributed practice over massed practice for learning (Cornelius and 
Modigliani, 1985; Smith and Rothkopf, 1984), arguing that it allows for deeper processing of action-
outcome relationships (Mumford, Costanza, Baughman, Threlfall, and Fleishman, 1994). In short, our 
study suggests that the benefits of practice may increase as the massed nature of that practice decreases. 
Positive and negative experience transfer 
Our study also contributes by providing understanding of experience transfer (Singley and 
Anderson, 1989; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). Positive transfer occurs when experience with a prior 
event improves performance in a subsequent event. Negative transfer occurs when experience with a prior 
event weakens performance in the subsequent event. Most empirical work explores transfer effects within 
a given process like acquisitions (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002)13. Our study adds by showing transfer 
effects across multiple processes (i.e., acquisitions, JVs, divestitures). An original PMO member stated, 
“So we came to see the commonalities [in processes] and develop the documents as well. For example, 
there are a lot of different permutations in a JV, but in some sense, it has elements of both acquisitions 
and divestitures” (JP). Empirical work provides some support for positive transfer between two processes 
(Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). Our study extends this prior research by 
suggesting that there are positive transfer effects from acquisitions to JVs and divestitures, from JVs to 
acquisitions and divestitures, and from divestitures to acquisitions and JVs. We also provide more 
granularity about how such positive transfer occurs and why. Our data reveal that Dow leaders began to 
see how acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures all seemed to follow three basic phases – transaction, due 
diligence, and implementation – and that knowledge about how one phase (e.g., implementation) worked 
in one process (e.g., acquisition) would generally transfer to others (e.g., divestitures). As prior research 
                                                 
13 Research finds that when a focal acquisition is similar to the prior acquisition (as measured by their four-digit SIC 
codes), the performance of the focal acquisition is likely to be higher, thereby suggesting positive transfer effects. 
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on experience transfer (e.g., Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) generally does not 
assume intentionality on the part of executives linking knowledge about one experience to another, an 
added contribution of our study is showing how positive transfer may often be inherently intentional. As 
one example, a PMO manager noted: “Divestitures have an element of ‘internal due diligence.’ We want 
to ensure we understand the assets we’re divesting. So, taking those due diligence principles from 
acquisitions you can apply due diligence on yourself, prior to divestiture. Then, when we acquire and go 
through implementation you could put those items in reverse on the divestiture side” (JP). 
Our study also sheds light on negative experience transfer. We find that when codified knowledge is 
overly scripted it can lead to quasi-automatic behavior that may be inappropriate for the idiosyncrasies of 
a focal acquisition, JV, or divestiture. For example, an original PMO member recalled: “Each acquisition 
is completely different. Regretfully, we had a recent acquisition that was too rigidly following the 
templates. Our group didn’t recognize what needed to change on that. I think I have too many people who 
think if we have a set of guidelines, we have to follow those guidelines” (AJ). To prevent negative transfer, 
Dow encouraged business unit leaders to work with PMO coaches to help them understand what tools to 
use. As the PMO Director explained, “We have a PMO coach who is assigned to every one of our deals 
(acquisition, JV, or divestiture) and who is working with the business unit. Then, he or she would pick and 
choose what would be the appropriate template, the appropriate process or methodology for that 
particular transaction... We work with the business to select what tool is needed” (RC). 
In summary, a key managerial implication is that codified knowledge alone is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for successful experience transfer. Some tacit knowledge residing in a stable set of 
generalist “coaches” may also be needed. Further, our data suggest that managers’ use of “coaches” to 
guide the use of codified knowledge may become more important the more heterogeneous the activity 
(e.g., acquisitions, JVs, divestitures) since “There are no two deals that are the same.”  Therefore, 
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dedicated groups (like Dow’s PMO), and the knowledge that gets codified by the group, reinforce each 
other. Used in tandem they help leaders effectively disseminate ‘best practices’ throughout a firm. 
CONCLUSION 
Combining qualitative and quantitative data on acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, we explore how 
firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently. Our emergent theoretical framework indicates that 
concurrent learning is facilitated by a corporate function (PMO) and codified knowledge that is 
idiosyncratic to a particular phase (transaction, due diligence, and implementation), but that is utilized 
across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures and developed in a sequenced fashion. Besides shedding light on 
the nature of effective growth and observing the hidden relevance of distributed versus massed practice in 
the building of dynamic capabilities, we contribute by expanding understanding of experience transfer. 
Overall, our work is a first step in addressing concurrent learning and uncovering its related activities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Information on Dow Chemical 
 
 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Net sales ($m) 56,786 59,985 53,674 44,875 66,924 53,513
Net income ($m) 1,100 2,784 2,321 566 626 2,887
Earnings per share ($) 1.90 2.54 1.97 0.63 1.79 2.99
Dividends per share ($) 1.21 0.90 0.60 0.60 1.68 1.64
Net debt to capital ratio (%) 43 40 43 48 46 32
Number of employees 54,000 52,000 49,505 52,195 46,102 45,856
 
Table 2: Interview Data 
 
Informant  
number 
Informant 
code 
Informant  
title 
Years at Dow Number of 
interviews 
Hours 
interviewed 
1 RC Former Director of PMO 35 8 13 
2 DM PMO Project Manager 1 27 2 3 
3 MB PMO Project Manager 2 35 2 3 
4 JP PMO Project Manager 3 30 3 5 
5 TW Business IS Manager, IS PMO Focal Point 28 1 1.5 
6 BK EH&S Director, EH&S PMO Focal Point 28 1 1.5 
7 WM IS Implementation Program Director 27 1 1.5 
8 BK Business IS Manager 22 3  4.5 
9 JW Strategy and Business Dev. Manager 29 1 1.5 
10 MP Business IT Manager 25 1 2 
11 BS Data room Manager 20 1 2 
12 JB Project manager 31 1 2 
13 JS Project manager 22 1 2 
14 AJ Project manager 35 1 2 
15 SS Office manager 30 1 2 
16 SS Current Director of PMO 32 3 4 
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Table 3: Initiating Structure 
Element Illustrative quotes 
Creating a dedicated 
group and initial 
codified templates 
Program Management Office 
“My boss…called me into his office and said ‘Rich, we would like you to head up the PMO.’ And I said 
‘What is the PMO?’ ‘The program management office.’ ‘What’s a program management office?’ He 
said, ‘Rich, I don’t have a clue, but we talked to some consultants and they said we need one.’” 
“I brought in a finance person because I knew that one of the things that we were going to need is try to 
keep track of is cost synergies. I brought in a manufacturing and operations person.. I also brought in a 
computer person because we knew that we’d need to set up Web sites, we need to be able to share 
information; special file servers, etc.” 
Begin codification for acquisition implementation 
“There was just a lot of knowledge all over the place, but it was never in any central repository…. Nobody
knew what was going on.”  
“We didn’t have any documentation prior to UCC.  Before 1999, we managed more case-by-case; find 
whoever you can find and participate. We did not have a standard methodology around 
implementation.” 
Continually updating 
the templates 
Coaching by PMO  
“The business leader obviously knew the business, knew the business strategy, knew why they were 
doing the acquisition from a strategic standpoint. But, in general, that business leader probably had 
never done an acquisition… This is where the PMO coach or the PMO leader came in to play. He or she 
was the expert regarding the tools, the templates, the methodology”. 
After-action reviews  
“What we did when we were done with the transaction was have an after-action review…We’d review 
what worked and what did not work. Then we would take that learning and infuse that into our 
methodology, infuse that into the tools and templates so that the methodology and the templates we had 
were basically evergreen. We didn’t want them to get stagnant. We wanted to constantly improve on 
those tools” 
Table 4: Generalizing Structure 
Element Illustrative quotes 
Generalizing structure 
developed for one 
process into multiple 
processes 
Project Management Office role expands to help with joint ventures and divestments and not just 
acquisitions  
 “Once we showed the value of having this PMO group and how well we’d managed that Carbide 
integration, I think it was understood by corporate that leveraging that expertise to the other activities 
(JVs and divestitures) made sense.” 
“We expanded into JVs in 2003…all of the discipline that we had developed and learned with Union 
Carbide, we just turned around and applied that to those JVs.” 
Documents used for acquisition implementation are used to help with joint ventures and divestments 
 “The reason we are involved in joint ventures and divestitures (besides acquisitions) is that the same 
processes and the types of individuals you need to bring onto these teams are the same types of folks 
that are involved with M&As.  In that regard it has worked exceedingly well.”  
“We started working on acquisitions. And then executive management said, ‘Would you look at joint 
ventures?’ Shortly thereafter we had a lot of divestiture activity and so our capabilities just kept 
growing.” 
“You pick some of those implementation principles and start thinking about them somewhat in reverse 
as to how you make separations in divestitures.” 
Strengthening       
communication 
Cross-functional communication expands into joint ventures and divestments 
“We needed to be able to have cross-functional teams, and we needed to have an overall roadmap and 
communication so that people understood the overall sequencing as we move forward whether it’s an 
acquisition joint venture or a divestiture.” 
After-action review begins to include surveys 
“First of all we send them a questionnaire and ask them what went well, what are the areas of 
improvement. We then follow up with one-on-one interviews with the individuals.” 
“I had about 100 interviews of Dow leaders who work for joint ventures. …what we found is that 
there was a wealth of information but once we assembled it there were some gaps, there were obvious 
things that needed to be addressed but we didn’t have anything. So that is when we said, you know 
what, we need to develop some tools or templates or processes to try to address those gaps. And I 
think all of that then pulled together and helped to say okay, with all the whole body of work, now 
how is that impacting us, whether we are doing a joint venture, an acquisition or a divestiture.” 
 
Table 5: Backward-chaining structure 
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Element Illustrative quotes 
Sequencing structure 
based importance, 
complexity and unmet 
organizational needs 
Program Management Office role expands based on unmet needs  
“And the person in-charge of the deal would say, ‘Well, I guess we have to do a due diligence. 
Who do we need?’ And it was not coordinated. They had no idea who to even contact. There was 
no process discipline, they didn’t have a checklist, they didn’t train people... They had never done 
a due diligence. In fact, they couldn’t even spell due diligence.”   
“Frankly, it was such a pain for our business and corporate leaders to put together a due diligence 
team that they welcomed anybody who was willing to help them pull together those groups of 
individuals” 
“What we found also was that there was a tremendous turnover of people in the transaction 
phase. ..So there was really a lack of process discipline”.  
Codification occurs in phases, starting with the most critical and complex phase and then moving 
backward  
“Phase-wise, we first developed our expertise in implementation. And then, we…became the 
leaders of the due diligence phase of acquisition, JV, divestiture. And now we support the 
transaction phase.”  
“We used our implementation expertise across the three types of transactions (acquisition, joint 
venture, divestiture). And then we saw a place for ourselves in the due diligence phase.” 
“We were just focusing on the implementation of the acquisitions. Then we segued into joint 
ventures… And then, we went into the divestitures, and then all along here we started saying: ‘You 
know what, not only can our group help with the implementation but why don’t you let us drive 
and lead the due diligence effort.’ So we do the due diligence for the acquisitions, we do due 
diligence for JVs, we assemble all the information for due diligence on divestitures. And then 
more and more we’re spending time working with the transaction teams.” 
Enhancing knowledge 
transfer through coaching 
and cross-fertilization 
PMO coaching of business units continues to evolve to provide additional help to functional 
leaders within business units (and not just business unit heads) 
“I am in a coaching and counselling mode for IS managers as they go through the steps of the 
methodology…That communication is one way how we are constantly reinforcing the use of the 
methodology.” 
“They (HR functional leaders in a business unit) have got a project, and they’ve got a coach 
assigned to them and you work it together.  Issues come up, questions come up, the unexpected 
comes up, and you have a dialogue around that to help them think through, okay, what would you 
do, what are the variables involved here.” 
Sharing of knowledge within PMO  
“We have sharing from PMO project manager to PMO project manager so we keep that learning 
alive.” 
Sharing of knowledge among functional leaders  
Functional leaders within a business unit frequently communicated with other functional leaders 
within that business unit through the use of formal kick-off meetings and stable steering 
committees that would work together across the different phases (transaction, due diligence, and 
implementation) of a deal to help transfer knowledge.   
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Table 6A: Technical Fitness – Qualitative Assessment 
 
 
Definition Illustrative quotes 
“How effectively a capability 
performs its intended 
function” (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2009: 97-98). 
• “If I look back at the last 10 years, we’ve enabled 
some consistencies across M&As with the 
implementations moving faster than we’ve ever done 
before.” 
• “Deep down inside I believe our performance 
improved in divestitures.” 
•  “I’ve been participating in The Conference Board 
for seven to eight years listening to how other 
companies work on acquisitions or JVs or 
divestitures…Dow was in the top tier.”   
• “I have benchmarked all other companies and I truly 
believe we’re best in class when it comes to M&A” 
• “We are focussing more on the high value activities 
not some of the low activities,”  
• “Having those capabilities enables us to move a lot 
more quickly, a lot more efficiently, a lot more 
effectively than we did before.”   
• “Dow’s ability to perform acquisitions or JVs or 
divestitures absolutely improved by doing the other 
deal types.” 
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Table 6B: Evolutionary Fitness – Quantitative Event Study 1 
 
 
 
 
¹ † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 Coefficients have been multiplied by 103 and tests are based on robust Huber-White standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
CAR(-1,1) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-4,4) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-4,4) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-4,4)
Acquisition experience     0.151†     0.337**     0.365**     0.310*
Alliance experience     0.377***     0.412***     0.435***     0.366**
Divestiture experience     0.063†     0.004     0.038     0.049†
N     138     138     138     138     122     122     122     122     156     156     156     156
Acquisitions Joint Ventures Divestitures
